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MULTIPLE UNITIES IN THE LAW 
EMILy FOWLER HARTIGAN* 
The issues in ethics among differing jurisdictions are not simply 
about reconciling the formal rules of plural bar associations. Multiju-
risdictional ethics are not merely colliding codes or labyrinths negoti-
ated by choice of law rules. In a world newly in touch with its 
diversity, ethics must struggle with difference's impact on coherence. 
There is a crucial dilemma more profound than how to avoid violating 
the canons of ethics ur how to d.odge disciplinary proceedings, for the 
lawyer in a world of plural ethics: the dilemma posed by the primary 
tension in ethics today between reason and spirit. The jurisdiction of 
the "world" is concerned with not getting caught or not running afoul 
of what some bar committee decides is "ethical" in their back yard; 
the jurisdiction of the spirit of the law is something Else. The world 
and the spirit are not another Cartesian dualism, however-many 
commentators, n<- ~:.tly many feminists, are choosing to belong to 
"neither one nor the other" but to both, to both the so-called secular 
world and to the sacred.1 This is not a simple story. 
In the Oxford Etymological Dictionary? the word "jurisdiction" 
is identified as coming from the Latin root die- that means "word" and 
the Greek word dike for justice, and from a feminine word rendered 
jur- or jus- that the dictionary says ·is "an old term of law and reli-
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gion." Thus my talk of the dictions of law and religion, of world and 
spirit, is not ungrounded, as its roots are in the word at the center of 
this conversation. Nor is it irrelevant, even if unexpected, if I address 
the multiple unities of meaning in which a lawyer works, and call such 
an address multijurisdictionalism. These multiple unities, these many 
worlds, are embl<:~matic of a time in which we are recognizing that 
multiculturalism is not a trendy political program, but a reality. We all 
live in more than one world, more than one meaning system, more 
than one "horizon" of life, to use philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
term.3 The dilemma for a lawyer that I want to address is also a di-
lemma for political and legal discourse. It is one tapped by Tom Shaf-
fer in his book On Being a Christian and a Lawyer-a volume openly 
advocating that the lawyer remember that her ethics may require of 
her that she break the Code of Professional Responsibilities.4 I want 
to talk not about knowing what legal authority to elude, but about the 
most fundamental internal-and-external jurisdiction in which a lawyer 
lives, the self, in relation to the deepest challenge to that self's integ-
rity that I see on the legal horizon. 
As I hope to engage your hearing beyond the voices that may 
suggest that what I am about to say is out of order, let me first tell you 
about a book one of my students gave me to read recently. 1bis stu-
dent has come to see me several times to talk about his concern about 
being religious-in his case, evangelical Protestant-during his law 
school experience. Over the years many students have put it to me 
this way: Can I be a lawyer without losing my soul? The book, Salva-
tion on Sand Mountain, sounded pretty flaky to me. It was, he ex-
plained, about snake-handlers in Southern Appalachia. Now, I'm a 
Catholic and we are one of the world's major mystery religions, but 
snake-handling is not named as one of our official mysteries, nor used 
to recite the rosary-it is not on the radar screen at all. 
The book started with a quotation from Flannery O'Connor, jolt-
ing me back into the world I knew all too well, Southern (anglo) Ca-
tholicism, a gothic genre that O'Connor and Walker Percy have made 
indelible. The quote, from Mystery and Manners,5 promises a descent 
into oneself, which entails a journey into one's region, one's place. 
Suddenly I was back in my grade-school years on the edges of Vir-
ginia's tidewater and Appalachian cultures. With some nostalgia, I 
3. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Wein-
scheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans. , 1991). 
4. THoMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FoR THE 
INNOCENT (1981 ). 
5. See DENNIS CoVINGTON, SALVATION ON SAND MouNTAIN (1995). 
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read half-way through the book. By then the author Dennis Coving-
ton, a university professor on stringer from the New York Times cov-
ering a murder trial, has followed the story into the Holiness church 
named The Church of Jesus with Signs Following-and he was "fol-
lowing" further than I dreamed he would. When I read one line in 
particular, I immediately flipped to the dust jacket to Harvey Cox's 
praise, for reassurance. If some guy at Harvard, the one who wrote 
Religion in the Secular City, thought this book was wonderful, maybe I 
wasn't going crazy. The next blurb on the dustjacket said "It is a rare 
gift to make the grotesque a source of meaning rather than ridicule 
. . . . " Snakes and Spirit were moving thick and fast, and what the 
author had just admitted was this: "I was open to mystery in a way I 
had never been in mainstream churches"6 -and he was feeling the 
urge to take up a snake. I w~s thinking he had made his unlikely 
journey sufficiently credible that I was in real danger of a genuine 
perspective shift, and my skeptical side was laughing out loud. A few 
pages later, the author tapped something that for a time reconnected 
me to some of my known world besides that of the Holy Spirit-to 
stories. "Narrative legal theory," came a legitimizing, almost profes-
sional inner voice. An orientation point. The author wrote: "At the 
heart of the impulse to tell stories is a mystery so profound that even 
as I begin to speak of it, the hairs on the back of my hand are starting 
to stand on end."7 Professor Patricia Williams-author of The Al-
chemy of Race and Rights8-and some of the best litigators I knew in 
my eight years of practice would understand about stories, I reassured 
myself. 
But I could not really avoid what Covington was suggesting, be-
cause he came right out and said it just a couple of pages later on: 
My uncle's [suicide] confirmed a suspicion of mine that madness 
and religion were a hair's breadth away. My beliefs about the 
nature of God and man [sic] have changed over the years, but 
that one never has. Feeling after God is a dangerous business. 
And Christianity without passion, danger, and mystery may not 
really be Christianity at all.9 
My problem was that I knew it wasn't just Christianity; I knew 
from my long agnostic years that Plato admits that that is just what 
Socrates says about philosophy. It is a divine madness, Socrates tells 
Phaedrus; it is a gift of the gods. There is no wisdom without it. 
6. Id. at 137. 
7. ld. at 174-75. 
8. PATRICIA J. Wn.r.IAMs, THE ALCHEMY oF RAc E AND RIGHTS (1991). 
9. CoVINGTON, supra note 5, at 177. 
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* * * * * 
In any attempt to deal with differing jurisdictions, differing locali-
ties, differing world views, there must be grounds for hope that differ-
ences are not the end of the story, but the beginning. If what seems 
ethical in Nebraska is markedly different from what is taken as ethical 
in New Jersey, absent a dictator (or a perfect rule) what we need is 
conversation among jurisdictions. That is, the best locus for some cre-
ative peace among differences seems to be in the talk among those 
who differ. Even John Rawls is saying that the issue is not what is 
right, but how we are to live together.10 Secular universalism like 
Rawls' is one unity, one experienced jurisdiction, but only one among 
many. 
I want to focus on the divide between the secular and the sacred 
that is most painful for me, and which has also received major atten-
tion in the legal academy, that between the s<rcalled religious and the 
secular or rationalist forms of talk. Perhaps no chasm within public 
discourse is so severe as that between those who try to deny any valid-
ity to one kind of speech, either devaluing secular talk or religious talk 
as literally worthless or dangerous. Such mutual disregard increas-
ingly fractures public talk about ethics. Some secularist commentators 
suggest that religious talk happens in a realm that is not within their 
experience, that it is simply Other than any way of knowing that they 
can recognize from their own "internal" processes. On that basis, they 
think it uncivil for religious people to persist in their own way of talk-
ing. Other secularists fail to acknowledge any distinctive nature of the 
religious, and by and large both camps within secularism fail to accord 
true respect to something I will call religious thought. They speak as if 
religion were that "childhood faith" that adults outgrow, that cultures 
transcend, or a private language willfully adhered ~o in disregard of 
their noncomprehension. Their repetition of (often unacknowledged) 
ignorance about what religion at its best might be, results in a set of 
arguments that are not likely to accomplish any of the political ends 
secularists claim to pursue, because they cannot maintain the respect 
for the Other that is necessary to engage the Other in true conversa-
tion. So long as rationalist arguments do not acknowledge that there 
are "other ways of knowing" about which no meta-epistemic scheme 
will afford an Archimedean point from which to dislodge the Other, 
they will produce arguments which rejustify rationalism to rationalists 
and reoffend the religious. Rational argument in its own encapsulated 
10. Jurisprudential Panel Discussion of the American Associate Law School Conven-
tion (1995) (available from AALS). 
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self-congratulatory loop, does not engage the Other. For the rational-
ist to risk. true engagement would be, I suggest, as difficult as true 
interfaith dialogue. However, I do not know if a rationalist has a par-
allel, open notion of such risk (except as expressed by Derrida as the 
move into the abyss).U There is one reason I know why interfaith 
dialogue is likely to work for the believer~ Religionists who choose 
interfaith dialogue tend to anticipate learning something about what 
they care the most about and know they will never fully know:. God. 
-If I risk true dialogue with a Jew, the kind of encounter where I truly 
open my soul to newness about God, at least the ground of trust is 
that I am in God's presenceY That I let go of Who that is, as I talk, is 
terrifying but also justified. Who guarantees the ground between me 
and the rationalist, for the rationaij.st? 
For me, the ground is guaranteed by God. God created reason 
· and reasoners, and so I can risk opening to them. I have written else-
where of my move to accord to some profo:und sense of con~cience 
the same degree of political respect that l ask for my religicms beliefs, 
but I can do so only as a primarily, explicitly religious move.13 That is; 
I am not argued into it. Structurally coercive discourse does not force 
me to see the light . . Reason does not "dictate" to me. I move because 
of love and because. my religion tells me to love my enemy. To me, 
the spiritual advocacy of love of the enemy is at the center of a grand 
joke: If I can trust to risk such love, truly trust rather th~ force my-
self, then what that grace returns to me is increase in love of myself, of 
my neighbor, and of my God-not to mention reason. That is why the 
promise of the good news is, to me, that if I love my neighbor, all that 
I value will be enhanced So when rationalists or secularists start to · 
drive me crazy by trying to silence my true voice, I tell myself that 
they are part of God's paradoxical sense of humor, they are necessary 
to my salvation, they are a face of God, too. So I ca~ ·risk truly talking 
with them, which must in its deepest good faith entail that I open up, · 
finally, all that I think I know, to question. Tbat mcludes ()periing up 
11. I view Derrida as making a remarkable 9ouble move, a ·combined hyperrationafity 
through almost excruciatingly intense rational analysis of a text, with a mystical sense of 
the "kenotic" (in his tradition, tzim-tzwn) c;mptying of known meaning that creates space 
for new meaning. This is, ironically, a religious move, as suggested in supra note 1. 
12. Douglas Sturm affirms the possible parallel between inter-religious dialogue and 
"a more extensive dialogue we must initiate among all kinds of communities. ;tcross the 
globe." Douglas Sturm, Crossing the Boundaries: On the Idea of Inter-religious Dialogue 
and the Polilical Question, 30 J. E CUMENICAL Sruo . 1, 3 (1993). Tellingly, Sturm identifies 
feminist-liberationist perspectives as crucial for the sort of inter-religious dialogue that 
opens rather than dominates, discourse. 
13. Emily Fowler Hartigan, Surprised By Law, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 147. 
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my relationship with God. In my tradition, there is a powerful strand 
of what is called "God beyond God" in the mystics, or in less gnostic 
African-American preaching, letting go of God-in-a-bottle.14 That is, 
my tradition itself has accounts of movement into unknowing, as inte-
gral to belief. My tradition itself teaches that we do not know God in 
a credal strangle-hold, but in a living dance of "I believe; help Thou 
my unbelief." It says that God's ways are not ours, that we cannot 
understand God. That mystery, that unknowing, that intellectual 
(much less spiritual) humility, is built into the legacy of my church. 
Thus to move to unsureness about God is a familiar if frightening 
move. 
What would allow a secularist to make a commensurate move? 
What would give them reason to trust that they will not lose who they 
somehow truly are, if they were to risk, in conversation with believers, 
some experience that there is a God? I must admit that I am not sure 
of the answer, but I have some intimations from conversations with 
colleagues who acknowledge that I am truly Other to them because of 
my experience of relation to God. These dialogue-partners range 
from defenders of religious liberty in ordinary constitutional terms to 
those on the edges of experience who cannot call it an experience of 
religion but can call it sacred, to those who allege they have no spiri-
tual sensibilities whatsoever. What these persons have in common is 
an appreciation that what I am talking about is something they do not 
understand but they do respect. They acknowledge that the roughly 
nine-tenths of us who do believe in God, tell them something about 
what it can be to be human. For the overwhelming majority of ordi-
nary people, to be human is to be in relation with God. We have 
something we call spirit, as well as mind .and heart, that makes up who 
we are as persons. 
Many rationalists do not acknowledge that there can be in human 
experience something not open to what they consider rational under-
standing, which should be respected as Other, while some who ac-
knowledge the spiritual think it can be radically severed from the rest 
of the self and privatized from political discourse. Ironically, ground-
ing out in something called universal humanism or universal human 
values or universal human reason, they do not count what nearly all 
North Americans consider constitutive of being human: relation with 
14. There is increasing recognition that such an approach-called kenotic or 
apophatic traditionally, and "negative theology" in contemporary terms- may be key to 
the movement of Derrida's deconstruction. See, e.g., DERRIDA AND NEGATIVE THEoLOGY 
(Harold Coward & Toby Foshay eds., 1992). 
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God, having a soul. I am not very consistently interested any more in 
rationalistic, academic-philosophic discourse, but I know it is human, 
and I respect it. I still see the intensely abstract beauty of John Rawls' 
work, and I still can experience its elegance and goodness. I would be 
as appalled as I am at the negation of free exercise that the Supreme 
Court has performed recently, should Reasoners loose their constitu-
tional safe-place, the free speech clause. But many of them are trying 
to erase my constitutional space, collapsing religion into speech, re-
ducing the Word to words. 
How do I engage these enemies-in-process-to-Beloved-Others? 
How do I find ethical ground to share with the Samaritan jurisdiction? 
What do I say to begin a conversation with those who deny the dis-
tinctiveness of my (elation to God, and cannot hear me when I speak 
my primary language? When lhe very issue is the value of my lan-
guage, how do I talk to the Other without betraying my language? I 
suspect I must do it as I am learning that one must live richly in a 
bicultural city: I must speak both languages. I must be willing to try 
to speak in Rational, although there is a paradox that I cannot over-
come in that. I believe God created us with excellence, and one of 
those is Reason. I also believe that all the reason in the world, with-
out love, is like a tinkling cymbal. (There is such a thing as empty 
reason. There are also empty words of love.) So I should begin with 
Reason that arises from love, but warn the Reasoners from the outset 
that I think Robert Bolt's Thomas More is right: finally it isn't a mat-
ter of reason; finally, it's a matter of love.15 
In fairness, not to mention love, I ask the Rational reader to act 
in good faith in this way: please read both the parts in your language 
and those in mine. My language is not destructive of yours, I believe, 
so what I write in my primary voice will be as one priest friend ex-
claimed after my first preaching experience in his Mass: "full of analy-
sis, too." But what may be difficult is that I know my reason does not 
ground out in reason alone; I think I do Reason pretty well, but I 
believe that all reality is sacred, redolent with God's grace, and that is 
how I hope to be present: awake to both reason and the mysterious 
One who created reason in love. 
To the Reasoner, I will say something finally paradoxical: you 
both negate me and you do not. You both attempt to reduce religion 
to something less than religion, to dismiss and colonize it-and what 
you are doing is being faithful to what you hold most valuable to you, 
and that is by my lights holy. As my "enemy" you are also my gift. As 
15. ROBERT BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEAsoNs 84 (1960). 
1006 Souru TExAs LAw REVIEW [Vol. 36:999 
Tom Shaffer accused Sandy Levinson of doing God's work in the 
world, 16 I am trying to say without imposing my perspective that I 
honor you as integral to God's creation. My tradition says that all 
things turn to the good for those that love God and are called accord-
ing to God's plan, and I believe that all are called, atheists in some 
strange ways as much as mystics. That my "enemies" are my gifts, 
does not mean that something does not have to turn, but that I do not 
rely on my righteousness and your lack of it, for that turning. 
* * * * * 
For now, I will pick three voices to engage. They belong to two 
law professors and one philosopher. The law professors are advocates 
of reason in relation to public discourse, and enter the discussion on 
what, if one were to accede to "sides in the culture wars," would be 
the secular humanist side. The philosopher, who is also a classicist, 
has recently been a visiting professor of law, and has added to the 
liberal philosophical tradition a potent argument for the necessity of 
including feeling in any full ethical discussionP She, however, still 
sides with reason, for political reasons.18 And I confess that a fourth 
has crept in, through history and accident, and my O"Wn story: I wrote 
a dissertation on John Rawls over twenty years ago, but only in the 
recent past have I had any real conversation (though very brief) with 
him, and am still beguiled by him despite the transparency, to me, of 
his myopia in relation to religion. I still am in conversation with "the 
father," and he is as winsome an elder Reasoner as there is. 
These three (four, she confesses) are earnest, deft, and powerful 
analysts. Their work is focused on human value in an unequivocally 
committed, ethical genre that could be called passionate in its fidelity 
.· to its expressed goals. They are all writers in the masculine analytic 
mode primarily, but especially the philosopher explicitly (and bril-
liantly) attempts to reintroduce the necessary affect of moral dis-
course or narrative, and the law professors betray considerable 
intensity and dedication to their enterprise of making the world a 
more humane place. But none of the three can give adequate account 
of the realm of the spirit in public discourse, nor of the necessity for 
them to acknowledge it as either Other or severable for them. They 
16. Thomas L. Shaffer, Levinson Builds the Kingdom: Comment on "Professing 
Law," 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 73, 80 (1986). 
17. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LoVES'S KNOWLEDGE: EsSAYS ON PHILOS· 
OPHY AND LITERATURE (1990). 
18. Letter from Martha C. Nussbaum, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University, to 
Emily Fowler Hartigan, Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law (on file 
with the South Texas Law Review). 
,-
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do not write in a way that respects those of us who believe that we are 
to love God with our whole minds, hearts, souls and strengths and to 
love our neighbors as ourselves-and that maybe even those two can 
be summed up by "Love one another as I have loved you." In that 
last formulation may lie the sly promise of Jesus: That if I can love 
these three as Jesus and Mary loved us, I will be fulfilling the com-
mand that has God's name in it and so will those three. Enemies will 
have turned to friends. Let us see what happens. 
I have chosen David A.J. Richards because he writes so directly 
into the contradictions I want to examine; I chose Christopher Eis-
gruber because when he gave a paper at Penn Law School while I was 
teaching there, he acknowledged that the believer was to him truly 
Other; and I chose Martha Nussbaum because she wrote directly into 
the nexus of religion and feminism which I am exploring, and which I 
think is a necessary prelude to my encounter with these three 
Reasoners. 
Nussbaum reviewed three books on feminism recently,19 yet be-
gan with a discussion of Michael McConnell and religiously affiliated 
law schools. I think there is indeed a connection between non-Ration-
alist feminist thought and non-Rationalist religious thought, but that it 
is barely visible because of the stereotypes in modem North American 
culture that surround feminism and religion. 
Let me rehearse some of the stereotypes. Religion is seen as 
right wing. Feminism is seen by religious writers as a threat to tradi-
tion and thus to religion. Feminists tend to see religion as patriarchal 
and thus repressive. Feminists are stereotyped as secular pro-choice 
irrational outlaws. Religious thinkers are irrational anti-abortion 
hyperlaw-abiding yet violent repressers. It is religious thought which 
is at the core of homophobia, sectarian strife, and intolerance in his-
tory. It is feminists who are tradition-destroying, home-wrecking 
shriekers. Feminists attack rationalism, and it is reason that will save 
us from the politics of repression. Religion is repressive and inher-
ently politically intolerant (after all, they think they're RIGHT about 
things). So the answer is to require a certain form of discourse, ra-
tional discourse. Only by criticizing and attempting to banish relig-
iously-based views in public discussions, will we be safe from the true 
roots of deepest human error. All the good things religion has seem-
ingly done, were really done by reason. M.L. King was really acting 
from the wellsprings of modus ponens when he was most effective. 
19. Feminism and Philosophy, THE NEw YoRK REVIEW OF BooKs, Oct. 20, 1994, at 
59. 
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Unless we get Rosemary Radford Reuther to take a vow of obedi~ 
ence, she will topple the Pope and all true Christendom. But you can~ 
not be both a feminist and a Catholic. 
This last paragraph oversimplifies, but it does capture ce11~ral as~ 
pects of what the Rationalist, the religious anti~feminist, and the anti~ 
religious feminist strands of thought foster. These threads of dis~ 
course are both silly and illuminating, both wrong and right. Right~ 
ness is in the relations; as any good Socratic can tell you, it's all in how 
the dialogue is woven, how the threads intersect. And we already see 
that we are indeed dealing with multiple jurisdictions, and strange 
intersections. 
Central to all three Rationalist writers is a concern for con~ 
science. They identify this as a secular notion, because it is from 
within.20 Of course, if we are made in God's image, conscience is not 
secular, but part of what God gave us. That we experience it as al~ 
ready ours does not negate its religious character. So what is it about 
religious sensibility that marks it off from the secular? Eisgruber 
claims it cannot be done. He cites Douglas Laycock's attempts to de-
lineate religion as distinctive, and says that Laycock has not succeeded 
in portraying anything that the conscientious secularist does not 
have-at least not anything worth honoring.21 If religion is that dan~ 
gerous, what is its danger if it is just a subspecies of conscience? If 
religion is somehow something that taps the non-Rational, thus leav-
ing the person at the mercy of tendencies to bum heretics and kill 
infidels, then it is different from conscience. If it is not different, is not 
peculiarly dangerous-unless it is an illusion, and its danger lies in its 
very deception. And that attribution of being deceived, of operating 
out of non-reality, is one face of the Rationalist intolerance of reli-
gion. When I think I am having a conversation with· my God, even if I 
agree with Buber that it isn't really God if I use the third person but 
only if I use the second person (I speak to, listen to, You), I am de-
luded. What I think is happening is not, and thus whatever I do is not 
to be respected. My delusion is the sort that produced the religious 
wars in Europe, and was the scourge of history. 
However, if contrary to these Rationalist assumptions, there is a 
"real" possibility that I may be in genuine conversation with my God, 
20. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L . REv. 
1245, 12~9 (1994); David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Clas· 
sification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initia-
tives, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 491, 506 (1994). 
21. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 19, at 1271. 
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if that is an acknowledged potential, if the Rationalist is not absolutist 
about Rationalism, then I am no more dangerous than the Rationalist. 
I might even be less so, but my particular religious view says that I am 
equally dangerous and valuable at once. My religion leaves to the 
Rationalist the mystery of her or his own path. (It does leave me won-
dering, always, what difference it makes to experience that I am loved 
by God, but I have only my own individual years of agnosticism and 
hours of daily doubt to tell me, and that is only my answer.) 
What is the danger of continuing the constitutional protection for 
religion? Eisgruber and Richards seem to conclude that it diminishes 
rationalists; Richards also makes it clear that he believes that the gen-
esis of the evil he so fiercely combats, homophobia, is in religion.22 
For Rawls, the history of Europe openly manifests the evil of Christi-
anity. For Nussbaum, religiop is politically inferior, whatever that 
means.23 
So the realm of the illusory supposedly creates distinctive evil in 
the forms of religiously-based incapacity to see the gay or lesbian as 
fully human and a genre of intolerance unknown to secularists. For 
Eisgruber, the distinct evil seems to be a denial of equal regard to the 
deeply held convictions of secularists. For Nussbaum, it is regression 
into a state of belief in a transcendent (Christian) God who does not 
exist and belief in whom prevents growth into the correct stage of 
political consciousness.24 For each of these three. unfortunately, the 
22. Richards' main point is expressed many ways; one incarnation of this idea is that 
gay-bashing is a "hegemonic, homophobic religio-cultural orthodoxy." Richards, supra 
note 20, at 5fJ7. Further, he decries the "sectarian religious expression" of "irrational polit-
ical prejudice" in the fonn of homophobia. Id. at 509. 
23. It may mean the sort of thing argued recently by Professor Abner Greene. See 
Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Ckluses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993). 
In a most rationalist mode, Scott ldelman successfully critiques the impossibility of 
taking religion seriously and performing Greene's attempted political balance. See Scott C. 
Idleman, Ideology As Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of The Religion 
Clauses, 1994 U. Iu.. L. REv. 337 (1994). 
24. For instance, in a brilliant exhibition of writing in favor of story and feeling, she 
critiques Beckett because of what she identifies as his "deeply religious sensibility;" "[t]he 
complete absence in this writing of any joy in the limited and finite indicates to us that the 
narrative as a whole is an expression of a religious view of life." Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love, 98 E1HICS 225, 251 (1988). She then 
accuses Beckett of "religious prejudice" because of his valuation of a "soul before and 
apart from all social constructing." I d. 
Her most recent work turns from the constructed and local to the transcendent, but 
identifies the transcendent with abstract reason. She now lauds abstraction to the extent 
that she criticizes rather superficially a Hindu practice, noting that "the bare fact that a 
human society invented something gives it no cklim at all to our respect." Martha C. Nuss-
baum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 197,217 
(1994) (emphasis added). In contrast to the Hindu practices which are blind and cruel and 
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disregard of religion has a degenerate strand that is of all things tri-
umphalist. Reason has shown God to be irrational, and thus those 
who have moved beyond God are ahead of the believers. They (the 
three or the four) are impatient for us to grow up. They have yet 
really to accept that we have grown up; we are just different. The 
most unexpected irony for me is that those who profess such a fine 
politics of difference, have no spirituality of difference.25 
I remember one particular encounter with this lack of acceptance 
of difference, an encounter that for me illustrates the conundrum of 
rationalist triumphalism. At a conference on feminist theory about 
eight years ago, I had been struggling with the distinct hostility to reli-
gion then characteristic of mainstream academic feminism. One par-
ticipant, a foundational feminist coming from a strongly secularist 
Jewish background, became upset when I talked of my church's 
apartheid against women, their refusal of priesthood to women. She 
found the use of the word "apartheid" offensive because what I was 
describing was not commensurate, she said, with the sort of racism 
that term evoked. I found myself led to tell her that to her the parallel 
was not visible, but to those of us to whom spirit was very real and in 
some senses the nexus of the integration of all life, the denial of the 
central sacramental role in our faith community, the very liturgical 
core of our shared mystical communion, based on our sex, was the 
most painful segregation of life. I had to tell her that although for her 
such disjunction for spiritual purposes might not be important, be-
cause of my difference from her there was nothing more fundamental 
to me. I accepted that she could not see on her own why such a dra-
matic word was appropriate for me, but I had to express my 
difference. 
Thus, I both disagree with Richar.ds' like portrait of "reality" and 
with its facile avoidance of the possibility that religion, because it is 
not in Richards' ken, may be both true and at once beyond his ration-
"superficial impulse[s]," she seems to nominate her judgmental stance as operating from "a 
deep layer of reflection." ld. at 211. At the same time she elevates Kantian abstraction to 
a special reverence and awe that signals a "sense of divinity." Id. at 212. By now, Nuss-
baum is confused, forgetting where Kant got the reverence he held for the moral law 
within: Kant believed in God. And Hindu belief, in my tradition, has according to the 
Pope, the light of truth that is to be respected in all major world faiths. Respect does not 
mean slavish agreement, but it also does not dismiss so cavalierly the complex mores of 
ancient cultures. 
25. Professor Paul Campos points out that, for Rawls, this secular fundamentalism 
functions as his "God term" or foundational, ultimately inexplicable-much less justifi· 
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alistic calculation of political forces.26 It is William Stringfellow, a 
wildly prophetic Christian, homosexual lawyer, who reminds us that 
the Christian is called not to be effective but to be faithfui.27 The 
Christian, Stringfellow proclaims (Abraham Joshua Hesche! so ech-
oes, as does the Muslim Rumi, the Bhuddist Thich Nhat Hanh, etc.) 
that a person is not encompassed by what that person thinks or knows, 
but by something more. That something more is the sort of thing that 
Harvard philosopher Stanley Cavell pursues, bursting from a rational-
ist framework, finding political calculation of either epistemology or 
ontology, ludicrously constrained.28 It is "something more" that gath-
ers the strands of the recurring idea that there are more things than 
are dreamed of in our philosophies, and suggests that a continuing 
sensibility to the unknown and u,nexpected is a crucial part of human 
life. 
Not only has Richards failed to engage the realm of the unknown; 
he has not come to grips with the very culture he so passionately de-
fends. Gay playwriter Tony Kushner's Angels in America29 begins to 
portray the world beyond mere reason, and its funky, contradictory 
protagonist is the redeemed gay Prior, whose frame of reference more 
than disrupts analysis. It flies right through the restricted maze of de-
ductive logic, on huge silver wings. Paradoxical logic, cross-dressing, 
and demented angels of God announce the breakthrough of the sa-
cred into the secular. Kushner is not simply taking advantage of the 
aesthetic medium; he is proclaiming an intellectual and cultural (and 
of course spiritual) event that is now constitutive of the public dis-
course. What Richards rails against religion for having destroyed-
creative gay and lesbian culture-crows in spiritual triumph on Broad-
way. Kushner's play is not anti-reason; it simply moves beyond reason 
alone. 
This is my main argument with these four Reasoners: They rely 
on reason alone. They want to banish spirit, rather than simply point 
26. He reduces Martin Luther King's witness to rationalism, concluding that King's 
Leuer from Birmingham City Jail"crucially turned on arguments of public reason available 
and accessible to all moral persons" who want to resist an "unjustly subjugating politico-
religious epistemology." David A.J. Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 69 
CH!.-KENT L. REv. 787, 838 (1994) (footnote omitted). The oppressors are religious and 
political; the liberator political and rational-hardly a portrait true to King's own world 
view. 
27. See generally A KEEPER OF THE WoRD: SELECTED WRITINGS OF WILLIAM 
STRINGFELLOW (Bill Wylie Kellermann ed., 1994). 
28. See generally CAVELL, supra note 1. 
29. Tony Kushner, ANGELS IN AMERICA: A GAY fANTASIA ON NATIONAL THEMES: 
PART ONE: MILLENIUM APPROACHES (1993). 
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out that human spirit like human reason is open to evil, or admit that 
for them personally spirit talk is either impossible or too embarrass-
ing. Nussbaum allows heart with her head, but still prohibits soul; Eis-
gruber and Richards cannot manage to trust soul. I am deeply wary of 
supposed reason alone, and of reason-and-heart without spirit, but I 
accept that there are those to whom that is how the world constitutes 
itself. Why can they not do the same for me? Why must they tell me 
that my dwelling in spirit is conducive to intolerance (by implication, 
more than is reason), has caused many historical harms, has no dis-
tinctive character, is politically unwise and thus expendable, and not 
realize that these same charges could be turned around and be like-
wise unprovable? 
There is a crucial move afoot here, and it is personal-and-intellec-
tual conversation that has allowed, for me, the next step: talking 
across this very difference between sacred and secular. The general 
framework is exemplified by my conversation with Rawls, at the Juris-
prudence panel at the AALS convention this year. I tried to address 
him with profound respect, and yet maintain my difference. I told him 
that I was different, did not agree with his notion of civility (which 
would silence my religiously-based "untranslatable" talk) and wanted 
to know if we could talk as equals in public. He tried, through pro-
fessing more than once that he did not understand what I was getting 
at, what I was doing (I had told him: talk as equals in public, about 
social justice). He proposed that we begin by flipping a coin and then 
each in turn proposing a set of principles to govern the public sphere. 
I said I could not do that, that I had to have actual first and second-
person talk in addition to his move to immediate third-person abstrac-
tion. He said "Well then how would you begin?" I replied that I 
would begin with stories; could we still talk, I asked? He said he did 
not see why not.3o 
There are reasons why not, of course. Then, it was time and 
place. Afterwards, when I went up to him to ask if he wanted to try to 
continue, he was as gracious as he is reputed to be, and confessed that 
he was comfortable where he was. 
What then, when the rationalist father of the dominant discourse 
is comfortable? Do I try to tell him how destructive patriarchy has 
been, how dehumanizing rationalist discourse has become in some 
parts of (especially the legal) academy, how violent the hegemony of 
privilege is? Do I try to match his historical estimation of religion 
with the historical narratives of feminist and religious thinkers decry-
30. See supra note 10. 
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ing pha l!: ·_:w centrism? I have already told him that I honor his ration-
alism, rt'' :·.:ct the beauty of his intricate opus, but want to know if he 
can talk . 1 th me in public as an equal-is his comfort, his lack of 
curiositY :is effective dismissal of my voice, something to be at-
tacked? · e knows he does not fully understand me, and he and the 
reasone1 · _, o not want to, perhaps because they think they already 
know wr. · it is I mean, and they have transcended my superstition, 
thank yo:. It appears they have no notion that I might offer them 
somethin: :1ew. I do not want conversion, of them or me, but open-
ness to t~ · new. What does the Rawlsian disinclination, mirrored in 
Nussbau··· _ dismissal-by-politics and Richards' dismissal-by-moral-in-
feriority · the public voice of the non-rationalists, mean to public 
discourse: 
Let ~ .; l- suggest a step-not an answer, but the story of what a 
next step ·::ight require rather than where it may go, because that is 
precisely 'l mystery. The next step would be to propose that what a 
friend sal· .. ·, o me at the AALS convention, is the most honest move in 
this disco: : ' e that I have yet heard. My friend is a law-and-religion 
scholar a;:~ avowed secularist, but akin to Sandy Levinson and Doug 
Laycock, r-, t: attends the discussions with deep attention. He is wres-
tling with his Judaism. And what he said to my frustration was to me 
astonishin ~ . and necessary, as he said what I could not. (In true con-
versation, one can only wait for the other to answer, not psychologize 
the other'5 proposed discourse.) When my friend mentioned the rep-
resentative notion that religious talk was not accessible to him, I an-
swered with an expletive deleted, because he had used the word 
"understand." I said that of course he could understand-and he then 
said that I was right that it was somehow cognitively available to him, 
but that it was emotionally unavailable. His block, his distance from 
religion, was emotional. Of course, we began to talk about the Holo-
caust. This is not a new thought; the German intellectual giant Jurgen 
Habermas has said that all is changed after the Holocaust, and all talk 
of politics (and theology, of course) must take account of that. This is 
not to exclude other things that must be mentioned, like North Amer-
ican slavery and contemporary homophobia, but it is one that comes 
at a peculiar angle in an academy largely populated by Anglo-Protes-
tants and Jews.31 
31. Durin!! the Law and Religion panel discussion at the 1994 American Association 
of Law School; Convention, Sanford Levinson commented that the combined faculties of 
the elite law sc·: •Jols contain fewer than a handful of openly professing Christians. 
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My friend knows what his fears about that conversation between 
sacred and secular are, and he is working with them. I do not hear his 
non-comprehension as willful, as some deliberate withholding, but as 
something he is willing to examine, but only if the ground of discourse 
seems safe. How do believers make it safe, I start to ask, and then 
realize that both the Reasoners and the Others must contribute to the 
safety, and both must accept the inherent dangers of the unknown. 
This sort of discourse is one Tom Shaffer talked about in his por-
trait of the lawyer who has a tradition, On Being a Christian and a 
Lawyer.32 There is built-in discomfort. There is the prospect of un-
predictable change, if there is real engagement. Catholic theologian 
David Tracy puts it bluntly: "It cannot be overemphasized that, if gen-
uine dialogue is to occur, we must be willing to put everything at 
risk."33 
Such a requirement seems rather steep ~or a discussion of mul-
tijurisdictional ethics. Yet we are talking about the possibility of any 
form of coherence in the public order, without which everything is at 
risk anyhow. When a culture tries to become a multiculture, it risks 
genuine incoherence and intractable (versus felicitously periodic) 
chaos. It risks unprogrammatic anarchy, and unchosen violence. It 
risks a degree of injustice that can corrode all involved. We are not in 
easy times but in the proverbial "interesting times" and there is no 
way without risk. There is no way except by way of unknowing,34 to 
get to what we do not know. I suggest that we embrace mystery and 
risk with whatever form of optimism, sometimes called faith, that we 
may muster. And then start to talk with one another as if our lives, 
and perhaps our souls, depended on it. 
32. See generally SHAFFER, supra note 4. 
33. DAVID TRACY, DIALOGUE WITH THE Oni:ER: THE li'ITER·RELIGIOUS DJALbGUE 
95 (1990). 
34. " In order to arrive at what you do not know, you must go by a way which is the 
way of ignorance." T.S. Eliot, East Coker, in COLLECTED POEMS 187 (1963). 
